



















This article examines the market conditions, the strategies, and the 
organizational structures of agricultural cooperatives. Based on the 
growing literature on cooperative organizational models, it is expected that 
the new organizational patterns in the New Zealand dairy cooperatives in 
the early 2000s are a consequence of market changes. Case studies of the 
three cooperatives are conducted, focusing on the organizational structures 
in terms of collective versus individualized attributes. The dissolution of 
the New Zealand Dairy Board created new market opportunities for the 
cooperatives. Hence, the co-operatives had reason to develop new market 
strategies, and in order to pursue these well, they changed their 
organizational structures. The observations indicate that more liberalized 
and open markets require cooperative organizational models with more 
individualized traits.  
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Introduction 
 
In New Zealand, the dairy sector has recently changed from being regulated to 
being deregulated. At the same time the structure of the dairy cooperatives has 
undergone considerable changes.  
Organizational theorists have found that an organization’s structure is linked 
to its strategy (Chandler, 1962; Miles and Snow, 1978; Hall and Siais, 1980). 
Many writers on cooperative organizations (e.g., van Bekkum and van Dijk, 
1997; Kyriakopoulos, 2000; Nilsson, 2001; van Bekkum, 2001) claim that 
cooperatives tend to follow different organizational principles depending on their 
market conditions, because different markets call for different strategies, each 
requiring its own set of organizational resources. This article sets out to 
investigate whether this reasoning holds true in the case of the New Zealand 
dairy industry. Hence, the aim of the study is to investigate whether the New 
Zealand dairy cooperatives altered their organization structures as a result of 
market changes brought about by the deregulation of the dairy sector.  
The New Zealand dairy industry at large is presented in the next section. 
This is followed by an account of relationships between markets, strategies and 
organizational structures. After a short presentation of how data were collected, 
the three dairy cooperatives are introduced. Then, these data are analyzed so that 
conclusions can be drawn in the last section.  
 
 
The New Zealand dairy industry 
 
Dairy production in New Zealand is extensive. New Zealand has about 13,700 
dairy herds that supplied a total of 13,000 million liters of milk in 2001/2002 
(LIC, 2003; van Bekkum, 2001). About 95 percent of the dairy produce is 
exported. New Zealand accounts for 30 percent of the world’s trade in dairy 
products (www.MarketNewZealand.com, 2003). 
The New Zealand dairy industry has undergone a wave of mergers. In 1935 
there were over 400 cooperatives; in 1960/61, only 180 (Dobson, 1990; 
Frampton, 1992). In 2001, two large and two small cooperatives remained. The 
large ones, The New Zealand Dairy Group (NZDG) and Kiwi, merged in 2001 to 
form Fonterra, while Tatua and Westland remained independent (MAF, 2000; 
van Bekkum, 2001). 
The New Zealand Dairy Board, NZDB, was a legislated monopoly that had 
the exclusive right to market all export dairy products. While the cooperatives 
were in charge of the collection and processing of member milk, the NZDB 
organized shipping, packaging, transport, quality control, market promotion and The New Zealand Dairy Coop’s Adaptation to Changing Market Conditions  45
other services. With sales representatives around the world, the New Zealand 
Dairy Board (NZDB) conveyed market signals to the dairy cooperatives to 
ensure that their manufacturing program would meet the demands of the world 
market. The dairy cooperatives were responsible for marketing their products 
domestically (MAF, 2000; Dobson, 1990). 
In  1998,  the  government  announced  that  all  producer  boards,  including              
the  NZDB,  were  to  be  deregulated.  The  dairy  industry’s  response  was  to         
propose the so-called mega-merger (MAF, 2001). That would involve not only 
the  two  largest  cooperatives,  but  also  the  NZDB  would  be  integrated  into                
the new firm (van Bekkum, 2001). In 2001 the merger proposal was approved  
by the government and by the shareholders of the two cooperatives 
(www.fonterra.com).  
After the merger the industry consisted of only three cooperatives. Some 
facts about these are listed in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of New Zealand dairy cooperatives 
 
 Fonterra  Westland Tatua 
Number of suppliers, 
shareholders 





Volume of processed  
milk (milksolids) 
1,080,000,000 kg  29,547,000 kg  9,303,000 kg 













Australia; Asia  Australia; North, Central  
and South America; 
South East Asia; South 
Africa 
Turnover (NZ$)  13,924,000,000 178,529,000 111,241,000 
Source: Annual Reports 2002 
Fonterra dominates the industry, processing 95 percent of all milk nationwide. 
The cooperative produces mainly commodities, such as milk powder, cheese, and 
butter. Products are exported to 140 countries. Fonterra alone generates 20 
percent of New Zealand’s export receipts, corresponding to seven percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product (www.fonterra.com). 
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Westland’s main product is whole milk powder which is partly sold and 
marketed through Fonterra’s global network. Westland is building up its own 
marketing and sales organization and will increasingly market its own products. 
Tatua has invested heavily in R&D, processing plants and the development 
of value-added products. Two-thirds of Tatua’s revenues come from value-added 
niche products, such as nutritional supplements and bio-actives, sold globally. 
 
Markets, strategies and organizational models 
 
Cooperative organizational models 
During the last few decades, a large number of traditionally organized 
agricultural cooperatives have modified their organizational form. While 
agricultural cooperatives used to be a fairly homogeneous type of business 
organization, today they exhibit a quite diverse pattern. Previously, almost all 
were mainly collectively financed and collectively governed, and the members 
were treated equally (also a trait of collectivism). Today, many agricultural 
cooperatives have external equity capital – either external financiers own shares 
in the cooperative itself, or some subsidiaries are owned jointly with external 
capital interests. Many cooperatives have financial instruments, which allow 
members to invest voluntarily in their cooperative. The number of cooperatives 
with closed memberships has increased, i.e., such were there is a market for 
delivery rights. Furthermore, today cooperatives have gone far towards 
differential treatment of their farmer members, in contrast to the equal treatment 
that used to be sacred (Kyriakopoulos, 2001; Bogetoft and Olesen, 2007).  
The trend towards a more diversified population of cooperatives has caused 
researchers to make classifications (Hansmann, 1988; Barton, 1989; Cook, 1997; 
Cook and Tong, 1997; Hackman and Cook, 1997; van Dijk 1997; Torgerson et 
al., 1997; Nilsson, 1998; Kyriakopoulos, 2000; van Bekkum, 2001; Nilsson, 
2001; Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004; Van Bekkum and 
Bijman, 2006). However, there is no agreement about appropriate categories, not 
the least because the classifications are made for different purposes and within 
different cultural contexts. Nonetheless in most classifications, there seems to be 
a dividing line between traditional and non-traditional cooperatives, though non-
traditional cooperatives have many labels – entrepreneurial, proportional, and 
others. In this article, the label entrepreneurial is used. What divides the two is 
the degree of collectivism (in traditional cooperatives) versus individualism (in 
entrepreneurial cooperatives).  
Collectivistic and individualistic organizational attributes can be of various 
kinds. One fruitful conceptualization is in financial, governance, and 
transactional dimensions. This is also in accordance with the most commonly 
used definition of cooperative business, stated by USDA: “A cooperative is a The New Zealand Dairy Coop’s Adaptation to Changing Market Conditions  47
user-owned and controlled business from which benefits are derived and 
distributed on the basis of use” (Dunn, 1988). Van Bekkum (2001) suggests a 
model of how these three dimensions can be expressed in terms of collectivism 
and individualism (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Collective vs. individualized attributes 
in cooperative organizational structures 
 
  Collective structure  Individualized structure 
Investments    
Financial entry 
conditions 
Free and costless entry.  Closed membership or subject to 
members’ ownership of production 
rights. 
Financial instruments  Collective reserves 
without any individual 
rights, risks, obligations 
or benefits; member 
loans with no or limited 
interests. 
General reserves (minor); member 
loans; capital accounts; voluntary, 
long-term, tradable, non-voting, risk-
bearing and high-interest-bearing 




Addition to reserves 
(major), price 
supplements. 
Addition to reserves (minor); 
dividend payment on production right 
basis. 
Nature of the right to 
residual claims 
Held by the membership 
as a collective; 
permanent; non-tradable. 
Held by individual members; 
permanent but the attachment to 
transactions restricts duration of 
individual ownership; voting; 
tradable within the membership and 
hence appreciable. 
Governance    





and decision control in 
the hands of the Board of 
Directors. 
Separation of residual risk-bearing 
(members individually) from decision 
management, with decision control 
delegated to the Board of Directors. 
Transactions     
Pricing policy  Uniform pricing for all 
members, with some 
minimum criteria. 
Differentiated pricing in terms of 
volume and quality to reflect 
handling costs and market returns.  
Supply management  Unrestricted deliveries. 
Intake obligation from 
members. No significant 
entry barriers for non-
members. 
Delivery volumes are dependent on 
marketing needs, through obligatory 
purchase of production rights tradable 
among members. Some raw materials 
may be purchased from non-members 
as market opportunities call for. 
Source: Van Bekkum (2001:47), modified Jerker Nilsson and Camilla Ohlsson  48
Market strategies 
The process of cooperative organizational development can be explained in terms 
of changing market conditions. Competition is growing increasingly intense as 
agricultural policies are being liberalized, as markets are being opened, as the 
retail chains’ power is increasing, as consumer markets become more and more 
diverse, etc. The intensified competition means an economic squeeze in terms of 
prices, profits, and costs, so the cooperatives have increasing difficulties to pay 
good prices for the members’ products. The cooperatives have to react to this.  
One reaction is that many cooperatives have embarked on a differentiation 
strategy (Porter, 1998). By making their offers to the market different from those 
of competitors, the cooperatives can avoid the most competitive markets. 
Therefore, the cooperatives have to produce what the market demands, rather 
than selling what the members produce. This implies that the cooperatives 
increasingly direct the members’ production in terms of qualities, or volumes, or 
both. Moreover, differential treatment of members may become necessary 
(Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004). This implies a gradual shift in the power balance 
from the membership to the management. Another reason why the management 
has become more powerful is that differentiated business operations become 
more complex whereby the members may have difficulty controlling and 
directing the management.  
Another consequence of a differentiation strategy is the need for capital. 
Differentiated production and sales imply large investments in production as well 
as in markets. The processing of the members’ produce must be far-reaching, and 
much R&D is required. Furthermore market research, communication, and 
promotion call for capital.  
Hence, as traditionally organized cooperatives embark on differentiation 
strategies, they may face both governance problems and capital problems. The 
members do not want to make large investments in the cooperative, since after 
they have done so, they do not have full ownership to this capital – the control is 
in the hands of the Board and the management. Furthermore, the members have 
difficulties judging whether the management’s investment decisions will benefit 
them. Some of the farmers are no longer members when the investments are 
paying back, and all members have different preferences as to how their money 
should be invested, so collectively binding investment decisions do not suit them 
well when the amounts become large.  
Against this background it is no wonder that many traditionally organized 
cooperatives change their organizational form into an entrepreneurial form. They 
invite external financiers as co-owners, either in the cooperative itself or in some 
subsidiaries which are devoted to far-reaching processing, sometimes even in 
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introduce financial instruments which imply that the members’ investments are 
voluntary and the ownership is remunerated with an appropriate capital return. 
Through the new owners, there will also be more control of the managements’ 
investment decisions because the investors are keen that their capital is wisely 
used.  
While the differentiation strategy is an attractive option for many 
cooperatives, not all are able to follow it, since it may be very capital intensive. 
Thus, some cooperatives pursue a focus strategy. This is similar to a 
differentiation strategy as it involves making one’s product different from the 
competitor products, and it requires large investments per product unit. It differs 
as the product range is narrower and the market segments are fewer. Hence, 
many smaller cooperatives identify a specific market that is small enough that 
they can dominate this market, and so, they process the members’ products to 
suit the demand on this market.  
A focus strategy may hence involve large investments per unit of product 
processed as well as strong control of the farmer members’ production. Both 
these factors may explain the growth of relatively small closed cooperatives in 
recent decades, often called New Generation Cooperatives (Stefanson et al., 
1995; Cook, 1997; Nilsson, 1997). The farmers make large investments in the 
cooperative because they have individual ownership to their money, and they do 
accept being under tough control by the cooperative because they have strong 
control of the cooperative.  
Not all agricultural cooperatives can, however, choose a differentiation 
strategy or a focus strategy. If they were to do so, they would face even stiffer 
competition (with each other) on the markets for differentiated products, while 
the markets for undifferentiated products would be poorly satisfied by the 
cooperatives, i.e., this would be poor market adaptation. The markets for 
undifferentiated products consist of both consumer and retailer markets, 
demanding a low price for standard products, and the markets for commodities, 
sold to other manufacturers, who want to buy cheaply. Hence, a key 
characteristic of markets for undifferentiated products is price sensitivity, i.e., the 
criterion for being successful on these markets is the producers’ ability to 
produce at low costs.  
The so-called overall cost leadership strategy has historically been the 
natural strategy for traditionally organized cooperatives. In the childhood of the 
cooperative movement almost all markets were price sensitive, and almost all 
sales were of undifferentiated products. Thus, a processor that could find ways of 
producing at an average cost level, lower than that of all competitors, had a 
winning concept. One way of attaining a low cost level was to produce a large 
volume, thereby exploiting economies of scale in the manufacturing and Jerker Nilsson and Camilla Ohlsson  50
marketing activities. In this respect, the traditional cooperative organizational 
model has major strengths.  
Economies of scale come about through open membership, members’ 
delivery rights and all the other traditional cooperative principles (Nilsson, 
1998). Because the equity capital is collectively owned (built up from retained 
earnings), capital gains are used to raise the prices paid to the farmers. Therefore 
more farmers want to become members at the same time as existing members 
produce larger volumes. Because individual investments are not given any 
remuneration, these capital gains also help to recruit more members and get 
larger volumes. The socially attractive elements in the cooperative principles 
such as equal treatment and equal voting rights mean that more farmers want to 
become members. Cooperative ideology contributes to creating loyalty within the 
membership, thereby obtaining a stable inflow of raw products to the 
cooperative.  
Hence, the traditional cooperative organization form could be regarded as the 
ideal model for firms that want to be successful using the overall cost leadership 
strategy. All the collectivistic traits of the traditional cooperative model have the 
effect of raising the number of suppliers and of stimulating the suppliers to 
increase their production, so that economies of scale can be attained. The large 
number of mergers among traditional agricultural cooperatives during many 
decades also indicates that size of the operations is of great importance.  
The discussion above can be summarized as shown in Table 3. Each of the 
three main strategies, suggested by Porter (1998) seem to be connected to a 
specific cooperative organizational models (the italicized boxes in Table 3). The 
main dividing line is the degree of collectivistic versus individualistic attributes, 
and such in all respects – concerning ownership, governance, and transactions.  
It should be stressed, first, that the different strategies and the different 
organizational models can be combined. For example, a cooperative that in itself 
is traditionally organized may run its value-added activities in a subsidiary 
owned together with external investors.  
Second, the links are only indicative, i.e., many real-life cooperatives do not 
fit well into the pattern of Table 3. In particular many successful traditional 
cooperatives apply a differentiation strategy. This is so because also other factors 
may explain whether cooperatives with different organizational models are 
successful with specific market strategies. Factors (a) and (b) pertain to capital 
problems, while (c) and (d) are examples of factors that reduce governance 
problems.  
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Table 3: Connections between the organizational models  















because of large 
volume (economies 
of scale) and 
limited need for 
investments as 




hesitate to accept 
volume maximization 
as a goal as the profits 
become too small 
The cooperative’s 
volume is not 






Good prospects for a 
differentiation 
strategy because of 
access to capital and 
involved owners 
The cooperatives has 
not sufficient capital 






A focus strategy is 
appropriate but only 
for a minor part of the 
cooperative’s business 
operation(s) 
Good prospects due to 
involved owners, 
while the limited 
access to capital is 
acceptable due to 
small volume and 
specified market 
 
 (a) The assets used in non-core business activities may have increased in value 
so much that a cooperative has capital enough for investments in core business 
activities. (b) A cooperative may be so dominant at a specific market that it 
enjoys success, irrespective of whether it falls into another box than the 
prescribed box in Table 3 (van Bekkum, 2001). (c) The mentality within the 
membership, or the culture, may have the effect that members are satisfied with a 
specific cooperative model (e.g. Fahlbeck, 2007). (d) Personal factors may have 
immense importance, such as whether the directors or the CEO are skilled and 
motivated (Fulton and Giannakas, 2007). (e) Finally, the success of a cooperative 
depends to a large extent on the members’ (suppliers’) attributes; for example, if 
they are not able to produce at low costs, it does not help even if the cooperative 
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Methodology 
 
Data were collected in New Zealand in 2003. Personal interviews were carried 
out with eleven past and current representatives of the cooperatives and dairy 
industry organizations (see reference list).  
The interviews were conducted without a standardized questionnaire. 
Questions were prepared and structured, based on the constructs in the preceding 
section. The interviews were, however, open and often led to further questions, 
which were answered and developed upon by the interviewees. Of the three dairy 
cooperatives, the largest, Fonterra, is considered to be most interesting because it 
is the cooperative that has undergone the most thorough-going organizational 
changes. Hence, this cooperative is given greater consideration.  
 
 
The dairy cooperatives 
 
The New Zealand Dairy Board and the “mega-merger” 
The NZDB was governed by a Board of Directors consisting of thirteen 
Directors; eleven farmers, who represented their cooperatives, and two 
government appointees. The dairy cooperatives owned NZDB in proportion to 
their supply of products to the NZDB. In 2001, New Zealand Dairy Group owned 
58 percent of the NZDB and Kiwi owned 38 percent, Tatua and Westland 
owning the remaining four percent (MAF, 2001; Dobson, 1990). 
The New Zealand government in 1998 decided that all the producer boards 
should be dissolved, and the boards themselves should provide the government 
with plans for deregulation. The dairy industry responded by proposing a merger 
between at least the two largest dairy cooperatives. The operations of the NZDB 
would be integrated into the new firm (MAF, 2001). As mergers in the dairy 
business had proceeded for many decades, discussions on a final amalgamation 
had occurred for some time.  
An alternative to the merger, which was discussed, was a division of the 
NZDB between the two largest cooperatives with the smaller cooperatives being 
financially compensated. Tatua and Westland had stated that they were not 
interested in being integrated in the new dairy giant (van Bekkum, 2001). 
In December 2000, New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi announced that they 
intended to merge and that they wanted the new firm to include also the NZDB. 
A review of the proposal was commissioned by the government and carried out 
by external consultants. They stated that the structure of the NZDB had been 
appropriate when the dairy industry consisted of a large number of cooperatives, 
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merger with the NZDB was considered to be the best solution to achieve vertical 
integration in the industry since the costs of splitting up the NZDB between the 
cooperatives would have been too high (van Bekkum, 2001; MAF, 2001; 
Johnson, 2001). 
One factor that contributed to the merger was the structure of the industry 
and the power balance between the dairy cooperatives. From 1995, the 
ownership of the NZDB was attributed to the dairy cooperatives in the form of 
shares. The larger the cooperative, the more influence it would have on the 
NZDB. Hoping that increased influence would mean better possibilities for the 
respective cooperative to manufacture the products that generated a higher 
margin, cooperatives were eager to increase in size to gain more control over the 
NZDB (Kelly, 2003; Dalley, 2003). 
The deregulation of the NZDB was driven by external and internal pressure. 
One external force that pushed the NZDB in the direction of deregulation was the 
WTO negotiations. Classified as a State Trading Enterprise under WTO rules, 
the NZDB and other export boards were under pressure from politicians and 
trade officials.  
Of greater importance was the internal pressure, which came from critics 
both outside and within the dairy industry. The arguments were of both a 
pragmatic and an ideological character. Dobson (1998) points out the main 
arguments that some critics used in favor of a deregulation. These critics 
included for instance the finance minister, the commerce minister, and business 
people interested in exporting dairy products, who considered that reforms of the 
NZDB were needed to: 
 
   “create incentives for additional foreign investment in New Zealand’s 
dairy industry; 
   acquire the equity capital needed to permit the Board to become a more 
dominant player in international dairy and food markets; and 
   provide a corporate structure that would reveal in an unambiguous 
fashion how effectively the Board performs.” (Dobson, 1998, p. 10) 
 
Others were very negative to the creation of a huge and dominating dairy 
cooperative. An editorial in an influential weekly, the National Business Review, 
was particularly critical:  
 
“The government has shown surprising weakness by allowing the 
proponents of the dairy mega-merger to reorganise their industry in an 
anti-competitive way. … This is a political merger – it satisfies the egos 
of dairy company managers who believe their industry is, or should be, Jerker Nilsson and Camilla Ohlsson  54
the best in the world – but has little to do with sound business thinking. … 
One and one, in merger terms, do not usually equal to two but usually 
about 1.5. The benefits of ‛bigger is better’ are generally overstated.” 
(National Business Review, 13 April 2001, p. 21)  
 
The NZDB itself suggested a model where the NZDB would remain intact while 
the two processors would merge. However, this was not possible according to 
competition rules. The cooperatives were also interested in getting control over 
the assets of the NZDB such as brands, sales structures, and international 
marketing expertise. The processors therefore suggested a merger resulting in a 
large cooperative, which would also integrate the functions of the NZDB (Kelly, 
2003).  
 
“Whereas in the past [the processors] were the ‘slaves’ of this 
organization, they became the masters and the Dairy Board became the 
slave.” (Chris Kelly, former Senior Executive of the NZDB, interview, 
March 2003)  
 
Therefore, the formation of Fonterra was a decision made by the dairy industry 
itself. The idea behind the merger was to provide a platform for competing on 
world markets. A document, issued together with the merger proposal, listed 
reasons for the merger: 
 
   Cost savings: savings due to cost reductions in areas as supply chain 
optimization, procurement and administrative staff overheads. 
   Revenue enhancements and productivity improvements: benefits that 
“arise from better production planning, enhanced responsiveness and 
better co-ordination between manufacturing and marketing functions.” 
   Strategic benefits: benefits that “arise from the better realization of the 





Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd has 13,000 shareholders. Nine-tenths of 
shareholders’ production is exported. The main products are commodities such 
as milk powder, butter, casein, and anhydrous milk fat (www.fonterra.com). The 
organization structure is shown in Figure 1. 
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NZMP is Fonterra’s ingredients business. It encompasses collection of milk, 
manufacturing and packaging of over 1000 items, and the operation of a supply 
chain linking production plants in New Zealand and overseas.  
NEW ZEALAND MILK is Fonterra’s fast-moving consumer goods business, 
selling branded products internationally. The firm also operates plants abroad, 
especially in Latin America and Asia.  
The Fonterra Co-operative Group consists of a number of other enterprises, 
supporting Fonterra’s core business. These include a biotechnology company, 
technology development, a rural retailer, and an agricultural website. 
Fonterra’s main strategy is to be the “lowest cost supplier of commodity 
dairy products” (www.fonterra.com). Low costs are Fonterra’s major competitive 
advantage. A look at the product mix confirms this. However, the strategy also 
comprises value-added products: “a leading specialty milk components innovator 
and solutions provider” and “a leading consumer nutritional milks marketer” Jerker Nilsson and Camilla Ohlsson  56
(www.fonterra.com). Several interviewees think that the share of value-added 
products will increase. This will require increased investments in R&D and in 
marketing. 
Fonterra distinguishes between “cornerstone” and “non-cornerstone” 
activities. The former “involve the collection, processing and marketing of 
[shareholders’] milk and the activities with a strong link to selling or adding 
value to [shareholders’] milk” (Fonterra, 2003). Non-cornerstone activities are 
those in which Fonterra competes internationally, but which do not use 
shareholders’ milk. However, these activities require capital, and capital supply 
is from shareholders only. Because of the varying ability and interest among 
farmers to supply capital, there are discussions about de-linking or structuring 
these activities outside the cooperative, where shareholders are given an 
investment choice. De-linking non-cornerstone activities means that the 
proportionality between the supply of milk and the provision of capital is broken 
and that investments are open to external investors. Another option is a share 
structure where shareholders have the choice to invest in shares financing non-
cornerstone activities, in addition to the compulsory investment in shares 
financing cornerstone activities (Fonterra, 2003). 
Another strategic theme is to be an “effective developer of dairy ingredients 
partnerships in selected markets” (www.fonterra.com). Fonterra has partnerships 
and joint ventures, such as an alliance with Nestlé in North, Central and South 
America, a joint venture with Arla Foods in Great Britain, and a joint venture 
with Dairy Farmers of America.  
 
Transaction – pricing policy and payout 
The payout to the shareholders has two components: the Actual Milk Return and 
a value-added component. The Actual Milk Return is calculated by Fonterra for 
every season and is based on Fonterra’s revenues and costs. The value-added 
component expresses the cooperative’s net profits from capital investments, after 
an amount for reinvestments has been deducted.  
With Fonterra being the only cooperative of its size in New Zealand, the 
milk price cannot be set in relation to the milk price of other cooperatives; 
neither can the shareholders compare Fonterra’s performance in relation to other 
processors’ performance. For this reason, a benchmark price is calculated every 
season (van der Poel, 2003). This price is called the Commodity Milk Price 
(CMP) and is “a theoretical estimate of the price an efficient commodity 
producer could afford to pay for your milk and still make an adequate return on 
capital” (Fonterra, 2002d:4). Such a processor with an ideal long-term product 
mix is “invented” for benchmarking purposes (Fonterra, 2002d; O’Boyle, 2003).  The New Zealand Dairy Coop’s Adaptation to Changing Market Conditions  57
The CMP is calculated each year by an independent Valuer (Standard & 
Poor) and is based on international commodity prices and foreign exchange rates 
less an assessment of efficient manufacturing costs (Woodford and Robb, 2004). 
An actual CMP is calculated at the end of each season and is based on actual 
commodity prices and actual foreign exchange rates. The actual CMP can be 
used to assess the efficiency of Fonterra’s business by comparing the actual CMP 
to the Actual Milk Return. The Actual Milk Return is based on actual revenues 
and costs, whereas the CMP is a theoretical assessment of the cost of milk that an 
efficient commodity manufacturer could pay (Fonterra, 2002d). 
 
Investment – the Fair Value Share 
Shareholder investment in Fonterra is done through the purchase of Fair Value 
Shares. Each shareholder is required to hold one share for each kilogram of 
milksolids supplied under the season (Fonterra, 2002a; Fonterra, 2002d). 
In the past, transactions between the cooperative and its shareholders were 
based on nominal share value, meaning that the price of the share that a new 
supplier would pay should be the same as the amount he would receive when 
leaving. This made it difficult to assess the cooperative’s value. Fonterra 
introduced the Fair Value Share which reflects the value of shareholder 
investment. An independent Valuer estimates the Fair Value Share price every 
season. The increased value of the share is part of the returns from the 




The Board consists of twelve Directors. Shareholders elect nine Directors while 
three are appointed by the Board for their specialist skills. Elected Directors 
retire by rotation after three years and may stand for re-election 
(www.fonterra.com). 
The Shareholders’ Council (Figure 1) has 46 Councilors, representing 
shareholders in 25 wards. The Council ensures “that the cooperative nature of 
Fonterra is protected, that effective monitoring of the business by shareholders is 
able to take place, and that the needs of shareholders as both owners and 
suppliers are properly considered by the Board” (Fonterra, 2002b). It appoints 
the Valuer to establish the Fair Value range of the shares and the CMP, and 
appoints a Milk Commissioner, who arbitrates in disputes between shareholders 
and the cooperative.  
The Shareholders’ Council works with the Board of Directors to develop a 
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elaborated in 2002-2003 by Councilors and members of the Board (Fonterra, 
2002c; Pedersen, 2003). 
The voting system is one vote per 1000 kilograms of milksolids supplied by 
the shareholder. The exception is the election of Councilors for the Shareholders’ 
Council, where each shareholder has two votes (Fonterra, 2002a; O’Boyle, 
2003). 
A couple of years after the merger, Fonterra was still struggling with its 
corporate culture. New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi had different cultures and 
used to be competitors. The incorporation of the NZDB added a third culture. 
Although a large majority of shareholders voted in favor of the merger, they 
were sometimes reluctant to give up the identity of their old cooperative. 
Communication problems between shareholders and the new cooperative, 
combined with a low payout in the 2002–2003 season due to low world market 
prices, contributed to poor satisfaction among shareholders (Pedersen, 2003; 





Westland Milk Products decided not to take part in the mega-merger. The main 
reasons were a wish to remain in control of the shareholders’ investments and a 
fear of losing influence in the new dairy giant (Robb, 2003). 
Before the merger, Westland used to sell all its products through the NZDB. 
The cooperative mainly produced commodities, such as milk powder and butter. 
When the NZDB was abolished, Westland and Tatua received the value of their 
shares in the NZDB. This left Westland with a strong balance sheet. On the other 
hand, Westland lost its market channels because NZDB was integrated into 
Fonterra. An intermediate solution was an agreement according to which 
Fonterra markets Westland products. The amount of products marketed through 
Fonterra will be phased out as Westland is building its own sales structure.  
 
“However, there is a sense of sadness for many of us to see the Dairy 
Board absorbed into the large conglomerate, Fonterra. […] Westland has 
prospered … through the integrated industry and has had the luxury of 
concentrating on manufacturing excellence, leaving marketing to the 
Dairy Board.” (Ian Robb, Chairman of Directors, Westland, Annual 
Report 2002)  
 
Having been mainly in commodities, Westland is aiming at increasing its share 
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and a laboratory. Westland expects soon to have increased its activities in the 
fields of customer relations, R&D, product development, and processing (Robb, 
2003). A CEO with experience in high value milk ingredients and nutritional 
products has been recruited. A joint project with Tatua for the extraction of 
lactoferrins has been established (Westland, 2002; Robb, 2003). 
 
Transaction, investment and governance 
Westland applies a share structure, where the only types of equity are nominal 
shares and retained earnings. Each supplier holds one share per kilogram of 
milksolids supplied. The nominal share gives low entry barriers, but entry is 
restricted to farmers in the Westland area.  
 
“We are what I call a ‘true co-op’.” (Ian Robb, Chairman of Directors, 
Westland Milk Products, April 2003) 
 
The nominal value of the share enables present members to increase their 
production for a low cost. When members exit, they receive the same amount 
that they paid for the shares when entering the cooperative (Robb, 2003). 
Voting is distributed on the basis of one vote per 10,000 kilograms of 
milksolids with a maximum of ten votes per supplier. The Board of Directors 
consists of eight elected Directors and two appointed Directors with specialist 
skills, who are accepted by the shareholders at a meeting following the 





Tatua Co-operative Dairy Company Limited is the smallest of the cooperatives 
with 132 suppliers (Tatua, 2002). It is focused on value-added products, such as 
aerosol creams, bag-in-box food service products, caseinates, whey protein, 
hydrolysates, and other biologically active compounds (Frampton, 2001). Tatua 
was the cooperative that offered shareholders the highest payout in the 2001–
2002 season.  
The focus on value-added products has its origins in the 1970s, when Tatua 
anticipated that there would be further consolidation within the dairy industry. 
During the 1970s the NZDB introduced a “cost model” basis of payment, based 
on an assumed daily processing capacity of a plant. This induced all the 
cooperatives to build bigger and bigger plants in order to manufacture 
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Tatua could not compete with the larger dairies in the production of 
commodity products if it would be paid on the basis of NZDB’s cost model. 
Tatua’s response was to focus on high-value, low-volume markets. The first 
product introduced was aerosol whipped cream (Frampton, 2001). Tatua was 
asked to take part in merger, but wished to remain independent.  
 
 “Although we were asked many times to take part in merger discussions, 
no one was able to demonstrate that our shareholders would be better off 
in a merger situation.” (Alan Frampton, Chairman of Directors, Tatua Co-
operative Dairy Company Ltd, interview, March 2003)  
 
Part of the capital that Tatua received after the dissolution of the NZDB was used 
to develop an international exports network. However, Tatua continued to export 
a number of its products through Fonterra’s sales structures (Frampton, 2003). 
 
Transaction, investment and governance 
Tatua’s membership is closed, whereby the product supply can be controlled. 
Tatua applies strict rules of entry for new shareholders, with a number of 
requirements (Frampton, 2001; Frampton, 2003).  
The producer capital contributions are proportional to product delivery 
rights. Tatua’s shareholding structure is based on a nominal share of three NZ$ 
1.00 shares for each two kilograms of milksolids supplied. The shares used to be 
redeemable at their nominal value but not tradable. Since 1999/2000, a “hybrid” 
share structure is in place. In addition to nominal shares, there is the Milksolids 
Supply Entitlement (MSE), which gives the shareholder the right to supply a 
kilogram of milksolids. In order to receive full payout, the supplier must possess 
one (standard) share and one MSE for every kilogram of milksolids supplied. 
The idea is that the MSEs capture the value that Tatua adds to the milk. The 
MSEs can be sold, leased or given away among shareholders (Frampton, 2001; 
Frampton, 2003). 
 
“… the modern co-operative idea is to move a bit closer to the investor-
owned firm in the sense that you put a market related value on share capital 
so that new milk must pay an appropriate entry fee thus placing some 
control on the growth of the milk supply. There is an element of selfishness 
in this as compared to the old co-operative principles, but if you want to 
survive as a smaller company you have got to be able to control the milk 
supply.” (Alan Frampton, Chairman of Directors, Tatua Co-operative Dairy 
Company Ltd, interview, March 2003)  
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Just as supply is tied to shareholding, voting is based on one vote per kilogram of 
milksolids. A restriction is that no shareholder may have more that five percent 






The domestic market is of minor importance for the New Zealand dairy 
cooperatives. Hence, market changes within New Zealand, including the 
deregulation of the domestic market in the 1990s, have not affected the dairy 
processors notably. It is the export markets that count, with 95 percent of the 
volume. Hence, because the New Zealand Dairy Board was responsible for all 
exports of dairy products, the abolition of this organization in 2001 had 
fundamental repercussions.  
Suddenly, the dairy cooperatives had direct access to the international 
markets. They had virtually innumerable potential customers instead of only one, 
i.e., NZDB. They became responsible for marketing their products themselves. 
They gained direct communication channels to all markets. The dissolution of 
NZDB was a landmark for the dairy cooperatives’ market conditions (Pritchard, 
2005).  
On the international markets, competition increases all the time. This means, 
first, a constant price squeeze on the markets for commodities. There is a stable 
demand for these products, but their relative price level shows a declining trend. 
Moreover, new market opportunities develop as the world trade is being 
liberalized, as freight becomes easier, and as there are growing investment 
opportunities on the international arena.  
Second, intense competition stimulates firms to be innovative and sensitive 
to customer demands. This means a growing demand for value-added dairy 
products as well as tailor-made ingredients. Only a minor part of the New 
Zealand dairy products is sold as value-added or consumer products. The share 
is, however, increasing as both Fonterra and Westland find profitable business 
opportunities within these product ranges. Tatua has already for many years 
focused on value-added products.  
 
Strategies 
Fonterra’s main strategy is overall cost leadership (Sankaran and Luxton, 2003). 
Most  products are undifferentiated and exported as commodities on a global 
scale. Fonterra continues to expand this business, for example through 
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and with large quantities permitting low average processing costs as well as a 
good logistic and sales network, Fonterra is able to keep its position as the 
world’s leading low cost supplier. It will, however, have to make permanent 
efforts to keep the cost level at a minimum (Simons, 2002). 
The non-cornerstone activities should predominantly be considered to follow 
a cost leadership strategy. Fonterra makes use of its capabilities to process milk 
at a low average cost, also when the milk originates from foreign suppliers. 
However, these operations require investments. If these operations are de-linked 
from the rest of the firm and get non-suppliers as shareholders, a marked 
expansion may follow.  
With part of its operations in branded consumer goods and value-added 
ingredients, Fonterra has a differentiation strategy for some products. The 
margins are higher in consumer goods and enable the manufacturer to be a price-
maker, not merely a price-taker. With direct access to the global markets, 
Fonterra can exploit the growing demand for such profitable value-added 
products, offering high quality products at prices below those of the competitors. 
This strategy does, however, require large investments in R&D and marketing.  
Westland used to produce only commodities, exported through the NZDB – 
later through Fonterra. This is a cost leadership strategy, the products being sold 
on the world market for ingredients. The firm is building up its own market 
channels, adapted specifically for its products. As Fonterra will be phased out as 
a market channel, Westland is establishing a global sales network of its own.  
While the commodity business still dominates, Westland is about to embark 
on a focus strategy, going into the value-added segment. This implies large 
investments in areas such as R&D.  
Tatua has special ingredients and high value-added products as its core area. 
The cooperative has for several years pursued a focus strategy, aiming at high-
value, low-volume markets. The products are highly specialized and 
differentiated, perceived as unique, and have a high value on the market. The 
firm reaches the customers mainly through its own market channels – to some 
extent through Fonterra. Before the dissolution of the NZDB, part of the volume 
was sold through this organization, but Tatua had a special permission to market 
most products on its own.  
 
Structures 
Fonterra must most of all be considered a traditional cooperative. There are, 
however, also clear indicators that Fonterra is gradually adopting more and more 
entrepreneurial traits, which is in line with its strivings towards more value-
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The number of shareholders is large and the membership is heterogeneous. 
The structures of the cooperative are mainly collective, though with some 
individual elements. In terms of transactions, the cooperative has an open 
membership. The requirement to own Fair Value Shares is an entry barrier 
compared to the cost of joining traditional open cooperatives. However, because 
these shares offer the possibility of capital gains, farmers will hardly refrain from 
becoming members – on the contrary. The cooperative has an intake obligation 
for shareholder milk, i.e., the cooperative wants to have a large volume of milk 
from its suppliers.  
The special “Fonterra way” of calculating the milk price is a consequence of 
the cooperative’s dominance at the New Zealand milk market. Hence, this is 
above all an expression of collectivistic traits. The price is calculated through an 
administrative procedure, even though the aim of this is to arrive at a price level 
that corresponds to a market price for raw milk. An entrepreneurial element is, 
however, that Fonterra, in an effort to give correct market signals to the 
members, distinguishes between the value of the raw milk and the value of 
value-added processing activities. Therefore, the members get correct 
information for their decisions concerning how large sums to invest in the 
cooperative and how large volume to supply to the cooperative.  
The investment relationship is characterized by the appreciable Fair Value 
Share. The share is not tradable so its price is assessed administratively (by an 
external Valuer). Therefore, it is only a weak indicator of entrepreneurial 
cooperatives. By introducing the Fair Value Share, Fonterra gave the 
shareholders an incentive to invest in the cooperative. The members realize that 
such investments could give high returns. The appreciable shares influence the 
members to regard Fonterra as a modern, progressive business firm.  
The issuance of Fair Value Shares strengthened the balance sheet, whereby 
the cooperative could invest in profitable business ventures, also in non-
cornerstone activities and in value-added operations. Given good profit 
opportunities, the members accept risky investments, even such where their own 
milk is not being processed. The fact that the balance sheet shows a low share of 
unallocated equity can be explained by the Fair Value Shares. Because the shares 
are redeemed by the cooperative only upon the member’s surrender, they 
constitute a stable capital, provided that the volume of milk supplies remains the 
same, and so, Fonterra does not have to rely on unallocated capital.  
The governance relationship diverts from the collective “one man, one vote” 
in that voting is proportional to volumes supplied. Most notable is, however, the 
existence of the Shareholder Council – due to its autonomy it has the character of 
a watchdog. It was formed because the mega-merger would result in a very 
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ensure that the powerful Board of Directors would act in the best interests of the 
membership. Thus, this unit could be regarded as a result of the organization’s 
wish to operate at large scale. At the same time, the Shareholders’ Council may 
also be instrumental in guiding the Board about value-added operations.  
Westland  must, with its mainly collective structure, be classified as a 
traditional cooperative, just as it was before the dissolution of the NZDB. 
Transactions between the members and the cooperative are done solely on the 
basis of shareholding, where one share entitles the shareholder to supply one 
kilogram of milksolids. Membership is open to suppliers in the area 
(www.westland.co.nz).  
Investments in Westland are done through the purchase of shares with a 
nominal value. Hence, the entry barriers are low. A significant share of the 
equity comes from the receipts that Westland got for its shares in NZDB (over 
NZ$ 100 million
4). With such a large amount of (unallocated) capital in the 
balance sheet, Westland has possibilities to invest in R&D, production plants, 
marketing, etc. This explains the cooperative’s gradual shift towards a more 
differentiated strategy, in the form of value-added products. While less rich 
cooperatives might have tried to issue new shares to existing shareholders or to 
investors in order to pursue such a differentiation strategy, Westland does not 
seem to need more capital. Westland has an individualized governance structure. 
Votes are distributed in relation to milksolids supplied. 
Tatua has an individualized structure. It is an entrepreneurial cooperative 
with closed membership. The transaction relationship is strictly regulated by the 
possession of Milksolids Supply Entitlements, which serve as delivery rights. 
This implies high entry barriers for potential members. The system guarantees 
the control over the volume of milk supplied to the cooperative. The investment 
dimension is characterized by tradable and thus appreciable shares, which give 
the shareholders powerful incentives to invest in the cooperative, as well as 
incentives to monitor the operations carefully. The governance is individualized 





The aim of the study is to investigate whether the New Zealand dairy 
cooperatives altered their organization structures as a result of market changes 
brought about by the deregulation of the dairy sector. The discussions in the 
preceding sections give the following answers:  
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   The deregulation of the domestic market in the 1990s did not lead to any 
noticeable organizational changes in the New Zealand dairy cooperatives 
because the domestic market accounts for only a small part of the 
cooperatives’ sales. 
   The governmental decision to dissolve the NZDB was a major impulse 
for the development of new organizational structures in the cooperatives, 
mainly the fact that the mega-merger took place and that Fonterra got 
specific organizational attributes. .  
   After the cooperatives started working on the global markets on their 
own, they have taken on more and more entrepreneurial traits in their 
cooperative organizational model.  
 
During the existence of the NZDB, the cooperatives’ products were sold on the 
world market, but the processors had no direct access to the buyers. The Dairy 
Board functioned as a filter, whereby the cooperatives had both weak incentives 
to develop their own strategies and limited capabilities to do so. Low costs were 
their only success factor, and so, a traditional cooperative organization form was 
their natural choice because this gives the possibilities to reap economies of 
scale.  
The exception is Tatua, which had difficulties managing under the NZDB’s 
pricing model. Its response was to start selling value-added products, which it 
was permitted to export on its own. In this context, Tatua converted into a closed 
cooperative – an entrepreneurial form.  
When the government announced that the NZDB should be dissolved, the 
dairy industry leaders realized that new market opportunities would be opened 
for the cooperatives. The new strategies fostered new organizational structures. 
One opportunity consisted in proceeding with selling commodities to the world 
market, but for this to take place more efficiently it would be advantageous to 
have NZDB’s resources within the cooperative organization. Therefore, New 
Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi merged, whereby they also ensured that NZDB 
would be integrated. For these operations, it was not necessary to change the 
cooperative organizational form. The introduction of the Shareholders’ Council 
did not imply any major change – it only facilitated for a market-dominating 
cooperative to operate.  
After NZDB was dissolved, all three cooperatives intensified their efforts on 
the global markets, though they focused on more or less different markets. 
Especially Fonterra, with its large size and its business-oriented suppliers, and 
initially also Westland, exploited their low costs in a cost leadership strategy.  Jerker Nilsson and Camilla Ohlsson  66
In spite of the cost advantages, production of commodities through the cost 
leadership strategy does not give very high profits to the cooperatives and their 
shareholders. Provided that the cooperatives have capital to invest in R&D, in 
advanced production facilities and in marketing, there may be a possibility to 
earn more money on value-added products. Hence, all three cooperatives have 
during recent years restructured their financial situation. The two smaller 
cooperatives have used capital they got after NZDB was dissolved.  
Fonterra’s solution is more radical. It issued Fair Value Shares to its 
shareholders. Through individually owned investment instruments, the 
cooperative shareholders have incentives to invest and to allow the cooperative 
to embark on a differentiation strategy. Hence, the Fair Value Share expresses 
that Fonterra has taken on entrepreneurial traits, even though the shares are not 
tradable. Another sign is the discussions within the firm to separate cornerstone 
activities and non-cornerstone activities (member milk, and non-member milk, 
respectively), whereby the non-cornerstone activities could be financed by 
members voluntarily. Further, the way Fonterra calculates its milk prices is 
instrumental in a financial context. Because the members regularly see how 
much of the payout is a result of the value-added activities, compared to how 
much the raw milk is worth, they are more willing to invest in the cooperative; 
therefore, the cooperative has capital to expand these business operations.  
Both Fonterra and Westland are still predominantly traditionally organized 
cooperatives, though they have lately introduced some entrepreneurial attributes, 
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